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ABSTRACT The modern pharmaceutical industry has always been dominated by a few 
large pharmaceutical companies, or ‘big pharma’. Until recent times, big pharma has 
enjoyed success through its integrated approach of exploiting growing scientific and 
technological know-hows and commercialising high value blockbuster drugs. However, 
a number of external and internal forces are influencing the value of pharmaceutical 
innovation, and making big pharma’s growth through integrated innovation model, 
unsustainable. To sustain growth, big pharma is adapting its innovation pathway, and 
complementing its model of creating value through new drugs and new markets with 
one that deliver the perceived value to users including patients, physicians, payers and 
policy makers. This paper maps the shifting paths of pharmaceutical innovation by ex-
amining big pharma’s responses to the forces that are affecting their innovation models. 
The shifting paths of pharmaceutical innovation have important implications for the 
global pharmaceutical industry which are also discussed in this paper.  
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Introduction 
 
This paper examines evolving paths of pharmaceutical innovation models within the 
current context of healthcare and pharmaceutical industry. It describes various external 
and internal forces that are affecting the value of pharmaceutical innovation, and how 
large pharmaceutical companies (or ‘big pharma’) are adapting their innovation models 
(strategies) in response to these forces. It also discusses the implications for the global 
pharmaceutical industry. The first part of this paper conceptualises pharmaceutical in-
novation in the context of technological innovation. It also describes the forces that 
produce technological innovation and determine its path. Conceptualisation of pharma-
ceutical innovation helps to identify pharmaceutical innovation models and their evolv-
ing paths. The second part sketches the evolution of pharmaceutical innovation models 
within the historical context. It provides a review of the key historical forces that have 
shaped the pharmaceutical industry and its innovation models. Analysis of the historical 
paths of pharmaceutical innovation is important because it provides the context for 
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mapping the shifting paths of pharmaceutical innovation. The third part provides com-
prehensive analyses of the external and internal forces that are affecting the value of 
pharmaceutical innovation, and includes illustrations of how big pharma is transforming 
its innovation models and creating value. The analyses of the forces and the selective 
illustrations of big pharma’s activities are drawn from various pharmaceutical and bio-
technology industry analyst reports as well as from daily reports on pharmaceutical 
industry by various industry monitors. The concluding section discusses the implica-
tions of the shifting paths of pharmaceutical innovation. 
 
Conceptual framework of pharmaceutical innovation 
 
Classical economist Joseph Schumpeter (1939) describes innovation as a function of 
economic change or, more specifically, economic evolution. Schumpeter defines inno-
vation as a new function of economic production (producing a new commodity, bring-
ing technological change in the production of commodities already in use, setting up 
new organisation or new form of organisation, creating new markets or new source of 
supply) that results from conscious efforts to deal with a given situation or fulfil a need 
in the realm of economic life. For example, the huge demand for antibiotics during the 
Second World War brought organisational change to fine chemical manufacturers 
Merck and Pfizer as they turned to manufacturing of pharmaceuticals (Chandler, 2005). 
Schumpeter’s ‘theory of innovation’ infers that innovation is the process of giving eco-
nomic value to an invention that has taken place irrespective of an objective need, such 
as, Alexander Fleming’s serendipitous discovery of penicillin (Mckelvey, 1996), or an 
invention that has taken place to fulfil a specified need, such as Edward Jenner’s discov-
ery of smallpox vaccine in the course of finding a protective mechanism against small-
pox (Riedel, 2005). 
     Schumpeter’s theory of innovation to a large extent has contributed to the concep-
tion of technological innovation. McKelvey (1996, pp. 16), along the Schumpeterian 
line, defines the ‘technological innovation process’ as ‘the process whereby agents act 
to transform new knowledge, inventions, and/or scientific techniques into economic 
value, often through products, production processes, and/or changes to the organisa-
tion’. Technological innovation occurs as four sequential activities—research, develop-
ment, manufacturing and marketing—that together constitute the value chain of tech-
nological innovation (Porter, 1985; Walters and Lancaster, 2000; Hamilton et al., 
1990). Pharmaceutical innovation (or, drug innovation as the meaning implies) incor-
porates these four activities of technological innovation. The value chain of pharmaceu-
tical innovation is illustrated in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: Pharmaceutical Innovation Value Chain 
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The ‘research’ activities comprise laboratory experiments involving the identification 
and validation of a druggable target (e.g. an enzyme causing inflammation) in the body, 
and identification and optimisation of a lead drug candidate that modulates that target 
(e.g. blocks the action of the enzyme). The ‘development’ activities include preclinical 
experimentation of the drug candidate in live cells, tissues or animal models to demon-
strate its safety and effectiveness. The drug candidate is then clinically trialled to dem-
onstrate its safety and efficacy in humans (Pisano, 2006).  
     Phase I clinical trials are done with a small number of people (typically between ten 
and one hundred healthy volunteers) to examine the drug’s safety. Phase II trials are 
done with a larger number of patients (between fifty and five hundred) to further ex-
amine its safety, and determine effective drug doses. Finally, Phase III trials are under-
taken using a very large number of patients (up to thousands of patients in many differ-
ent sites) to explore its long-term safety and efficacy (Pisano, 2006). At each step of 
research and development (R&D), knowledge and information are created that trans-
late into a hierarchy of optimisation, improvement and characterisation of the new drug 
(Nightingale, 2000; Nightingale and Mahdi, 2006).  
     Value is accrued to the new drug in the form of intangible capital, i.e. drug-specific 
tacit knowledge. The value is captured through owning the tacit knowledge by means 
of patent protection, and delivered through commercialisation of the new drug by ex-
ploiting specialised complementary capabilities in manufacturing and marketing. Com-
plementary capabilities in manufacturing and marketing also accrue value to the new 
drug in the form of tangible skills and capital investments (Attridge, 2007). An addi-
tional step in the pharmaceutical innovation value chain is mandatory regulatory 
(marketing) approval of a new drug by country-specific drug regulatory authorities, 
such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the US, based on experimental 
proof of the drug’s safety and efficacy in human (Pisano, 2006). 
     Technological innovation is produced by two distinct, but sometimes intertwined, 
forces, ‘demand pull’ and ‘technology push’ (Dosi, 1982). In demand pull, technologi-
cal innovation occurs in response to ‘recognition of needs’ (Dosi, 1982) in the eco-
nomic system. The outbreak and recognition of HIV/AIDS (Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus / Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome) in the early 80’s triggered the need for 
a cure, and subsequently resulted in the search and development of antiviral therapies 
and vaccines against AIDS in the 90’s (Pickrell, 2006). Development of anti-HIV thera-
peutic interventions as cures followed the ‘demand pull’ trajectory of technological 
innovation. AIDS also created a new market for pharmaceutical innovation. 
     In technology push, technological innovation occurs as a cumulative and continuous 
process, and follows the evolving paths of scientific and technological paradigms. Accu-
mulation of knowledge (scientific and technological) and subsequent progress along 
technological trajectories are translated into technological innovation (Dosi, 1982). The 
first recognition of cancer dates back to 3,000 BC. However, the first understanding of 
cancer was only possible in the 19th century owing to accumulation of scientific knowl-
edge between these two periods. Radical organ removal surgery, radiotherapy and che-
motherapy were the early successful anticancer interventions between late 19th and mid 
20th century. Since then, the expanding knowledge of the biological processes of cancer 
and advancing techniques of cancer imaging and diagnosis have been shaping many 
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promising anticancer interventions including cancer vaccines, monoclonal antibodies 
(MAbs) and gene therapies (Sikora, 2007).  
     Technological innovation can only be understood in the context of technological 
firms’ innovation activities. Pavitt (1984, 1991) argues that firms are the most impor-
tant source of technological innovations. Firms use their specific strategies, structures 
and competencies to produce innovation in order to gain competitive advantage and 
optimise economic returns (value). Large industrial firms are always at the forefront of 
technological innovations due to their ability to build and integrate firm-specific com-
petencies, coordinate cross-disciplinary and cross-functional specialisations, absorb 
technological changes through organisational learning processes such as R&D, experi-
ence and competitor information, manage resource allocation decisions, and assimilate 
multiple technological specialisations. This paper, thus, examines evolving innovation 
models of big pharma to trace the shifting paths of pharmaceutical innovation.    
     In summary, (technological) innovation can be conceptualised as a function of the 
value that is embodied in a new product or market or an organisational change. The 
value is created by firms through innovation activities along the value chain, and deliv-
ered through commercialisation of a new product, penetration into a new market, or 
implementation of an organisational change. In pharmaceutical innovation, a new drug 
or a new drug market represents the value that is created by pharmaceutical companies. 
As we will discuss in this paper, cyclical ‘demand pull’ and ‘technology push’ forces are 
creating new paths to pharmaceutical innovation. Pharmaceutical companies are adapt-
ing their R&D and business models to create value along the new paths. We will also 
find that new innovation models are either complementing the older ones, or displacing 
them, a pattern which has been described by Bower and Christensen (1995) as 
‘disruptive innovation’.   
 
 
Evolution of pharmaceutical innovation models—the historical context 
 
The path to prescription drugs—the ‘integrated model’ 
 
Though the modern pharmaceutical industry, dominated by a handful of large inte-
grated pharmaceutical companies, began its journey around the Second World War, its 
origin can be traced back to the mid-19th century in Europe as well as in the US. In 
Europe, particularly in Germany and Switzerland, chemical companies like Ciba, San-
doz, Bayer and Hoechst led the early European pharmaceutical industry during the sec-
ond half of the 19th century by leveraging their strengths in organic chemistry based 
manufacturing (Henderson et al., 1999). In the US, around the same period, special-
ised pharmaceutical manufacturers, such as Eli Lilly, Wyeth, Abbott and SmithKline, 
started to produce ‘over the counter’ drugs based on natural sources—plants, animals 
and minerals. Until the First World War, the US companies relied on the German and 
Swiss companies for supply of chemically synthesised drugs. Following the First World 
War, the US companies started to commercialise prescription drugs as well, such as 
vaccines, vitamins, sedatives, tranquilisers and heart medicines (Henderson et al., 
1999; Chandler, 2005). Fleming’s discovery of Penicillin in 1928 and the massive anti-
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biotic demands during the Second World War created an antibiotics commercialisation 
path for many of these pre-war era companies, supported by massive research and pro-
duction programs from the governments, particularly in the US (Henderson et al., 
1999). The path also led fine chemical suppliers in the US, such as Merck and Pfizer, to 
join prescription drug business and to acquire advertising and marketing capabilities for 
selling antibiotics and other prescription drugs to doctors and hospitals (Chandler, 
2005).  
     The post-Second World War era was marked by intensified R&D efforts from the 
pharmaceutical companies to produce more prescription drugs through exploiting new 
learning bases in microbiology, enzymology and biochemistry (Henderson et al., 1999; 
Chandler, 2005). The pharmaceutical companies emerged as large integrated compa-
nies, representing a maturing pharmaceutical industry. They acquired capabilities not 
only in pharmaceutical R&D and production, but also in managing large-scale clinical 
trials and regulatory approvals, as well as marketing and distribution of pharmaceuticals 
around the globe—the organisational capabilities that acted as barriers to entry into the 
industry (Henderson et al., 1999), and thus rendered them oligopoly (Chandler, 
1990). Driven by advances in basic scientific knowledge, economies of scope in thera-
peutic categories such as painkillers, anti-inflammatories, cardiovascular and central 
nervous system drugs, shift in drug discovery techniques from ‘random screening’ to 
‘guided discovery’, public and national institutional supports for health research, strong 
Intellectual Property (IP) regime, and stringent drug approval procedures (Henderson 
et al., 1999), the pharmaceutical industry turned into a more R&D focused innovative 
industry dominated by a handful of large integrated and profitable companies. 
 
The path to biotechnology R&D—the ‘collaborative model’ 
 
The discovery of the structure of DNA in the early 1950s, and subsequent invention of 
the techniques of genetic engineering in the 1970s created a new path for pharmaceuti-
cal R&D, a path involving knowledge and techniques that became better known as 
‘biotechnology’. Biotechnology became a research tool in drug discovery and screening 
processes based on the knowledge and applications of genetics and molecular biology, 
such as target-based drug discovery using cloned receptors. Biotechnology also became 
a production tool for the development of protein-based (recombinant) drugs, e.g. insu-
lin (Henderson et al., 1999; Chandler, 2005; Pisano, 2006). The biotechnology path of 
pharmaceutical R&D produced a shift in pharmaceutical industrial and commercialisa-
tion models. 
     A wave of university research spin-off companies emerged to commercialise bio-
technology R&D. But they lacked the essential capital and organisational capabilities 
needed to walk the entire commercialisation path. Eventually they relied upon the large 
pharmaceutical companies to support their commercialisation activities (Pisano, 2006). 
A few of them, for example, Amgen, Genentech, Genzyme, Biogen, were able to in-
ternalise capabilities necessary for developing, manufacturing and marketing their prod-
ucts, and turned into large integrated companies or ‘big biotechs’. They succeeded in 
becoming large integrated companies, in large part, due to having commercialised high 
value ‘orphan drugs’ for relatively rare, life-threatening diseases, and, in small part, 
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due to their successful contractual partnerships with the stakeholder pharmaceutical 
companies (Chandler, 2005).  
     However, the majority of biotechnology companies today are small- to medium-
sized companies that pursue enabling platform technologies in areas such as structure-
based (rational) drug design, high-throughput drug screening, bioinformatics, genomics 
(structure and functions of genes), genetic engineering, recombinant technology and 
products, etc. For the pharmaceutical companies, the advantages of partnerships with 
such biotechnology companies can be found in their ability to access specialised biotech-
nology knowledge and applications that are essential for drug discovery and develop-
ment processes, and also in their scope to access the high commercial value of novel 
biotechnology products. The pharmaceutical companies also adopted their own bio-
technology innovation programs based on their core competencies, and also through 
acquisition of small biotechnology companies, in-licensing novel technologies from 
them, or forming joint ventures or collaborations with them. By exploiting biotechnol-
ogy capabilities in ‘guided’ or ‘target-based’ discovery of small molecule and biological 
drugs, the integrated pharmaceutical companies produced a number of novel drugs that 
not only generated billion dollar in sales to become ‘blockbuster drugs’ (such as 
GlaxoSmithKline’s anti-ulcer drug Zantac, launched in 1982), but also helped sustain 
their dominance of the global pharmaceutical industry (Henderson et al., 1999; 
Chandler, 2005; Pisano, 2006; Hopkins et al., 2007). This ‘collaborative model’ of 
pharmaceutical innovation also preserved the ‘integrated model’ of the pharmaceutical 
companies. 
     The ‘big pharma’ evolved in the 1990’s in two distinct pathways. In the US, compa-
nies like Merck, Pfizer and Eli Lilly became very large through exploitation of emerging 
technologies in microbiology, enzymology, genetics, molecular biology and genetic 
engineering, and commercialisation of innovative prescription drugs. In Europe, com-
panies like Novartis, Aventis (now Sanofi) and GlaxoSmithKline achieved their sheer 
size through series of mergers and acquisitions between national and cross-national 
pharmaceutical companies. The mergers and acquisitions took place to exploit emerg-
ing technologies in drug discovery and development, expand and diversify the product 
portfolio, overcome competitive challenges in domestic and international markets, and 
achieve economies of scale and scope in the commercialisation of innovative drugs 
(Chandler, 2005). These and few other European and American companies dominate 
the global pharmaceutical industry today, and are commonly referred to as ‘big 
pharma’. 
 
Evolution of pharmaceutical innovation models—the current context 
 
The path to creating and delivering value—the ‘open innovation models’ 
 
Currently, big pharma’s growth through its integrated innovation model is becoming 
unsustainable due to a range of internal and external forces. As we will see in the re-
maining sections of this paper, external market forces such as payers (health insurers), 
government policies (healthcare reforms and drug price controls), emerging market 
dynamics, and dominance of low-price generic drugs over patented ones are command-
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ing the value of pharmaceutical innovation. We will also see that internal forces like 
soaring R&D costs are shrinking R&D productivity and the net value of pharmaceutical 
innovation. R&D productivity here can be defined as the value created by a new drug 
against the R&D cost incurred (Paul et al., 2010). These internal and external forces 
are creating intertwining opportunities and barriers to big pharma’s growth. In re-
sponse, big pharma is pursuing alternative innovation paths, and these paths are leading 
to ‘open innovation’ models. In the open innovation model, on the one side, big 
pharma is bringing many scientific and technological forces together so that the growing 
scientific and technological knowledge can be exploited to create value through pro-
ductive R&D; on the other side, big pharma is forming bridges with the market forces 
through various responses to deliver the value to users. The following sections discuss 
the external and internal forces that are affecting the value of pharmaceutical innova-
tion, as well as big pharma’s various strategies to create, conserve and deliver the value 
of pharmaceutical innovation. Based on the reports of company activities from various 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry analysts and industry monitors, this paper 
selects eleven big pharma companies for its analyses. They are AstraZeneca, GlaxoS-
mithKline, Sanofi, Roche, Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, Eli Lilly, Abbott Laboratories, 
Merck, Bristol-Myers Squibb and Novartis. 
 
Healthcare reforms and drug price controls—benefits and hurdles  
 
Crippled by the ballooning healthcare costs, policy makers (governments) around the 
world are implementing measures designed to contain public healthcare spending. 
Many developed as well as emerging countries, as the World Health Organisation’s 
(WHO) 2010 World Health Report (WHO, 2010) shows, are reforming their health-
care policies so that every citizen can access affordable healthcare services. The report 
describes the path towards universal health coverage by many countries, and the health-
care reforms they are adopting. Such reforms are extending affordable healthcare ser-
vices to disadvantaged citizens by means of prepayment of healthcare services, or man-
datory and subsidised health insurances. Following are two selective country-specific 
examples, the US and China, representing healthcare reforms in the developed and 
emerging markets, respectively. 
     In the US, the 2010 Health Reform Legislation (Affordable Care Act) will extend 
subsidised health insurance by 2014 to an additional 32 million citizens. The subsidised 
health insurance will extend to young adult citizens, low-income earners and citizens 
who have been rejected by private health insurers due to their pre-existing medical 
conditions (Tumulty et al., 2010; Pickert, 2010; Ford, 2010). Evaluation of the Af-
fordable Care Act suggests substantial gains for the pharmaceutical industry in the 
longer term. As millions more US citizens come under mandatory insurance cover by 
2014, the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry will gain from expanded market 
coverage. Citing a report from London-based research and consulting firm 
‘GlobalData’, Forbes (Japsen, 2013) reports that while rebates for prescription drugs 
through Medicaid programs will cost the pharmaceutical industry $20 billion over the 
next decade, inclusion of uninsured citizens in insurance programs will create $115 
billion in new business opportunities for the pharmaceutical industry, and boost indus-
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try profits by up to $35 billion over the next ten years. The Pharmaceutical Research 
and Manufacturers Association (PhRMA) and Biotechnology Industry Organisation 
(BIO) spent more than US$110 million during early 2009 campaigning in favour of the 
Act (Tumulty and Scherer, 2009), and later agreed to a cost of around $90 billion in 
ten years towards fees and discounts on Medicare and Medicaid drug pricing1. 
     In China, the government launched an ambitious healthcare reform in April 2009 to 
bring the entire Chinese urban and rural population under universal primary medical 
services. An estimated 1.2 billion people are now covered by a basic medical insurance 
system (Guo, 2011), including over 300 essential medicines (Wang and Li, 2011). This 
provides the international and local pharmaceutical manufacturers with the benefit of 
an expanded pharmaceutical market, although government measures to control essen-
tial drug prices will partly diminish the benefit of such an expanded market. 
     Similar to China and the US, a number of African, South American and other Asian 
countries have also undertaken healthcare reforms to extend healthcare coverage 
(WHO, 2010). Such healthcare reforms will expand the pharmaceutical market for 
international and local companies. However, as discussed below, government measures 
to contain healthcare costs are targeted towards controlling drug prices, which are in-
hibiting the growth of big pharma. 
     Traditionally, the regulatory approval of a new drug based on its safety and efficacy 
has been the biggest barrier to its market entry. But now the biggest hurdle for a new 
drug’s success is whether it would qualify for reimbursement from the payers 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2013). The payers are increasingly becoming important in 
determining the value of new drugs. Rising healthcare costs are forcing governments 
and payers to drive drug prices down. To qualify for reimbursement, pharmaceutical 
companies are now required to demonstrate through clinical trial results that their new 
drugs offer significantly more clinical benefit than existing alternatives (comparative 
effectiveness), and also reduce the total cost of care (cost-effectiveness) (Ernst and 
Young, 2010; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012a; Burrill, 2013).  
     According to a 2012 US survey carried out by PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Health 
Research Institute (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2013), 40% of customers postponed 
healthcare services one or more times within a year due to affordability concerns. In 
response, healthcare providers (hospitals) are finding ways to reduce costs of healthcare 
services to patients. In October 2012, three physicians at the Memorial Sloan-Kettering 
Cancer Center in the US decided that they would not prescribe a phenomenally expensive 
cancer drug, Zaltrap, marketed by Sanofi, to their patients with colorectal cancer, that 
costs over $11,000 a month but offers no better therapeutic results than another similar 
drug, Avastin, that costs only $5,000 per month (Bach et al., 2012). Sanofi immedi-
ately responded to the resistance by taking 50% off the price of Zaltrap (Palmer and 
Staton, 2012). This example shows why it has now become paramount for drug devel-
opers to demonstrate the superiority of a new drug over available alternatives, espe-
cially, when it is priced significantly higher than the alternatives. 
     Pharmaceutical companies are increasingly losing their control over drug pricing as 
governments around the world are taking radical measures to gain control over drug 
prices and determine reimbursement. Following are some selective country-specific 
1. ‘Editorial: What health reforms means for innovation,’ Nature Biotechnology,  2010, 28, 4, pp.293 
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examples of drug price controls in both developed (the UK, Germany and the US) and 
emerging markets (India and China). 
    In the UK, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) of National 
Health Service (NHS) uses clinical data on new drugs to assess their cost and clinical 
effectiveness (value) and whether they could be reimbursed. NICE incorporates citizen 
council in this process, so patients also have their voices  (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2012a). In 2009, NICE set up a fee-based scientific consultation service for pharmaceu-
tical companies in relation to their products in development that would be subject to 
future NICE evaluation (NICE, 2013). Pharmaceutical companies are collaborating 
with NICE to seek advice on clinical trial design to produce evidence of cost and com-
parative effectiveness. In January 2012, NICE recommended Tasigna, a leukaemia 
drug, from Novartis only when it agreed to offer the drug at a discounted price from its 
original price of £30,000 a year (Taylor, 2012a). In May 2013, NICE rejected Roche’s 
cancer drug, Avastin, due to the company’s failure to provide clinical data on about one
-third of participants, and also due to the drug’s proven benefit not matching its single 
dose treatment cost of £25,000 (Staton, 2013a). Also, effective from January 2014, the 
UK government will switch to a ‘value-based pricing’ scheme, whereby medicines will 
be priced according to the benefits they deliver to patients. The scheme will reward 
only ‘breakthrough’ medicines rather than ‘incremental’ developments (Cooper, 
2012). 
     In Germany, according to the ‘reimbursement modernisation act’ (2011), the 
launch price of new drugs fixed by drug developers stays effective for one year, and 
after that new drugs will be assessed for their extra clinical benefits over reference 
drugs in the market. If no superior clinical benefit is found, the pricing will be matched 
with that of reference drugs (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012a).  
     In the US, the Affordable Care Act sets out provisions (e.g. discounts) to reduce out
-of-pocket pharmaceutical costs, which means branded drugs could see $97 billion in 
lost revenue over the next decade despite the gains from expanded health insurance 
coverage (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012b). US President Barack Obama’s budget 
proposal for the 2014 fiscal year proposes to accelerate the closure of Medicare part D 
coverage gap (the infamous ‘donut hole’) by 2015 through 75% discounts (a 25% in-
crease from that in 2012) on branded drugs (Staton, 2013b).  
     India was set to launch from July 1, 2013 new price controls for 652 medicines with 
348 of them classified as ‘essential drugs’. The new pricing would apply to drugs having 
a minimum market share of 1%, with some cancer and HIV drugs facing price cuts of 
up to 80% (Palmer, 2013a). Recently, India denied patent rights to a number of expen-
sive cancer drugs, including Glivec of Novartis (sold as Gleevec in the US) and Sutent 
of Pfizer due to concerns that they are not affordable to most of the cancer patients in 
India. Also, the country is enforcing compulsory licensing of a number of branded can-
cer drugs (e.g. Roche's breast cancer drug Herceptin, Bristol-Myers Squibb’s leukemia 
treatment Sprycel) to generic manufacturers so that cheap generic versions can be pro-
duced locally (Staton, 2013c).  
     China is no exception to such price control measures. In May 2012, China amended 
its IP law to introduce the provision of compulsory licensing of patented drugs to local 
generic manufacturers in unusual or emergency situations (Taylor, 2012b). In August 
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2012, China announced it would double its number of price-controlled ‘essential 
drugs’ to 700 in pursuit of affordable and universal healthcare for its population of 1.3 
billion (Sweeney, 2012). To help reduce healthcare costs and make essential drugs 
available to a greater proportion of the population with basic medical insurance, in 
January 2013, the Chinese government announced forced discounts between 15-20% 
on 400 medicines that include several of big pharma’s biggest products (Staton, 
2013d).  
 
Emerging markets—opportunities and challenges 
 
Emerging markets like China, India, Latin America and Africa hold big promises for the 
global pharmaceutical industry. The rising burden of chronic diseases like diabetes and 
expanding middle-class affluence in these markets are creating big opportunities for 
pharmaceutical companies (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012b). According to IMS Insti-
tute for Healthcare Informatics2 (IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, 2012), drug 
spending in emerging markets is estimated to increase from 20% of global spending in 
2011 to 30% in 2016, whereas US and Europe’s combined share will shrink from 58% 
to 49%. The current African market size will double to $45 billion by 2020, and 
chronic non-communicable diseases such as heart disease, lung disorders, cancer and 
diabetes, are estimated to account for almost half of all deaths in sub-Saharan Africa by 
2030 (Berton, 2013).  
     Big pharma is responding to emerging market opportunities by increasing their 
stakes in these markets. In 2012, the global pharmaceutical companies invested $20 
billion in emerging markets, up from around $12 billion in 2011, and China accounted 
for nearly one-third of that investment (Hirschler, 2012a). Big pharma is forming joint 
ventures with local pharmaceutical companies in emerging markets. Between 2010 and 
2012, for example, Pfizer, AstraZeneca, Sanofi and Merck formed joint ventures with 
local companies in China, India and Brazil to gain advantages in areas such as branded 
generics, vaccines, consumer healthcare as well as from joint clinical development pro-
grams (Burrill, 2013). They are expanding their R&D, manufacturing and sales net-
works in these markets. In December 2011, Merck announced it would establish a $1.5 
billion R&D hub in Beijing to steer low-cost drug discovery and development opera-
tions (Carroll, 2011). Eli Lilly and Sanofi have slashed their sales forces in the US and 
Europe while expanding them in China. Novartis and AstraZeneca have also closed 
their manufacturing and R&D sites in developed markets while building new ones in 
emerging markets (Staton, 2012a). 
      But many challenges remain in emerging markets. Weak regulatory regimes and IP 
protection systems, and underdeveloped infrastructure are some. Also, lack of health 
insurance for the majority of populations in emerging markets means the patients them-
selves fund a larger share of drug costs than that of developed markets, and thus cannot 
support specialised drugs, e.g. biologic cancer drugs, that cost several thousands of 
dollars each (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012b; Burrill, 2013).  
     Though the middle-class affluence is growing, significant difference in per capita 
drug spending between developed and emerging markets will remain. According to 
2.IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics refers to France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Japan, Canada, South Korea, the US 
and the UK as developed markets.  
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IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics (IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, 
2012), per capita drug spending in 2016 will be $609 and $91 for developed and 
emerging markets respectively. Such differences in drug spending capacity mean that 
big pharma cannot expect to reap much of the value of their high-priced patented drugs 
in emerging markets, and have to rely on large volume generic drug sales.  
     Big pharma is taking various strategies to meet these challenges. For example, No-
vartis signed a deal with Jiangsu provincial government in China on its cancer drug, 
Glivec. Novartis will donate three doses of Glivec to the government for each purchase 
of one dose. This will bring the annual Glivec treatment cost to about $12,000, down 
from the US wholesale price of about $77,000 (Staton, 2013e). GlaxoSmithKline has 
been pursuing an innovative approach through its ‘least developed countries (LDC) 
business unit’ in 40 African and 10 Asian countries. The unit has a 50-50 focus on busi-
ness and reputation, and focuses on sales volume rather than profit margin. The pat-
ented drugs are discounted 75% or more from the UK price. The hybrid model 
achieved some early success as revenue was estimated to triple from £50 million in 
2010 to £150 million in 2012 with 20% profit margin (Hirschler, 2012b). Facing pat-
ent attacks in India, recently, Roche devised plans to shift manufacturing of expensive 
cancer biologics in India through collaboration with a local pharmaceutical company, 
and also proposed between 30-55% price cuts on a few cancer drugs (Palmer, 2013b).  
     Healthcare reforms across many parts of the world and growing emerging markets 
are expanding global pharmaceutical markets and, hence, the value opportunities for 
pharmaceutical companies. However, the value of new drugs is now determined and 
perceived by value users, in particular payers and policy makers, based on the perform-
ance and benefits the new drugs deliver, and also based on market-specific needs. 
Therefore, the value of pharmaceutical innovation is no longer embodied in new drugs 
and new markets alone, or commanded by pharmaceutical companies; rather the bene-
fits of new drugs delivered to and perceived by users in existing and new markets em-
body the value of pharmaceutical innovation. This can be called the ‘perceived value’. 
 
Patent cliff—the end of ‘blockbuster era’ 
 
The patent expiry of many blockbuster drugs, also regarded as the ‘patent cliff’, is dis-
placing the ‘blockbuster era’ of big pharma. As many of the blockbuster drugs are 
crossing the period of patent expiry and generic competition, the pharmaceutical indus-
try is facing $290 billion of global prescription drug sales at risk (the value corresponds 
to sales in years prior to patent expiry), and $148 billion in potential loss due to patent 
expiry of branded drugs between 2012 and 2018 (EvaluatePharma, 2012). Pfizer’s cho-
lesterol drug Lipitor which sold around $118 billion between 1996 and 2010, became 
the top selling drug of all time, and made Pfizer the world’s largest pharmaceutical 
company, went off-patent in November 2011 (Mehta, 2011). Lipitor, that earned 
nearly $11 billion in 2010, is projected to earn only $2 billion by 2016 (Datamonitor, 
2011). The top ten drugs (according to their annual US sales in 2012) facing patent 
expiry in 2013, generated combined sales of nearly $15 billion in 2012, and are pre-
dicted to lose nearly $8 billion of that value by 2016 (EP Vantage, 2013).   
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Patent cliff is also changing the drug spending landscape in developed markets. Accord-
ing to forecasts by IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics (2012), patent expiry of 
many blockbuster drugs will bring total drug spending in developed markets down by 
$127 billion from 2011 to 2016. Also, global brand drug spending is forecast to grow 
by only 8% from 2011 to 2016, compared to nearly 80% growth in global generic drug 
spending. According to the US prescription data from Express Scripts, a pharmacy 
benefits management organisation in the US, for the first time in more than 20 years, 
traditional prescription drug spending for common diseases (cholesterol or heart prob-
lems, ulcer, pain, depression, neurological disorders, and infections) fell in 2012 due to 
increased use of low-cost generics. There was significant increase in the use of these 
drugs by Medicare and Medicaid patients in many therapeutic areas (e.g. diabetes); 
however, low-cost generics replacing patented blockbuster drugs brought traditional 
prescription drug spending down. This trend will most likely continue in the short 
term, and by 2015, spending on traditional prescription drugs for different diseases in 
the US is expected to drop between 10-25% (Frazee, 2013; Stettin, 2013). 
     In contrast, spending on specialty drugs for chronic, rare and complex diseases is 
increasing. Spending on specialty drugs represented one-fourth of total 2012 drug 
spending within pharmacy benefits in the US, and is predicted by Express Scripts to 
grow 67% over the next three years. Specialty drugs treat diseases like cancer, HIV, 
hepatitis C, multiple sclerosis, and rheumatoid arthritis (Frazee, 2013; Stettin, 2013). 
They are mostly high-priced drugs prescribed by specialists, and involve ongoing pa-
tient follow-up and clinical monitoring (IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, 
2012). Specialty drugs can be orphan drugs to treat rare diseases such as Novartis’ Sig-
nifor, approved by the US FDA as an orphan drug in 2012, for treatment of Cushing’s 
disease (Mullard, 2013). Many specialty drugs are biological drugs (or, biologics) that 
include vaccines, recombinant proteins, and cell, tissue or gene-based therapeutics pro-
duced from microorganism, animal or human sources (FDA, 2010).  
     To overcome the revenue loss due to patent expiry of blockbuster drugs, big 
pharma is expanding its pipelines with specialty drugs that not only have high growth 
potential but also offer a number of advantages over traditional drugs. They are high 
price drugs for niche markets, their complexity makes them less vulnerable to generic 
competition than traditional drugs, and they require shorter development timeframe 
with smaller clinical trials on specific targeted patients than do traditional small mole-
cule drugs (Staton, 2013f). Big pharma is making merger and acquisition (M&A) or in-
licensing deals with specialty pharmaceutical or biotechnology companies to tap their 
portfolio of specialty drugs. Pfizer’s $68 billion acquisition of Wyeth in 2009 was 
aimed at strengthening its pipeline with biologics and vaccines that potentially offer 
high profit margins but requires only limited marketing expenses (Burrill, 2011). In 
2012, Johnson & Johnson in-licensed leukaemia antibody drug ‘daratumumab’ from 
biotechnology company Genmab for $1.1 billion (Carroll, 2012a), and in 2013 US 
FDA awarded the drug ‘breakthrough’ designation (Carroll, 2013a). According to a 
new law adopted by the US FDA in 2012, the regulatory agency designates 
‘breakthrough’ status to drugs that show significant improvements in treating serious or 
life-threatening diseases during clinical trials in order to fast-track their development 
and approval (Loftus, 2013). Very recently, GlaxoSmithKline has acquired Swiss bio-
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technology company Okairos for $325 million for its genetic vaccine development plat-
form against hepatitis C, HIV, malaria, tuberculosis and human respiratory syncytial 
virus (Carroll, 2013b).  
     Several big pharma companies are also upscaling or commissioning biologic manu-
facturing operations in both developed and emerging markets. In 2012, Novartis in-
vested $500 million to build a new biologic manufacturing plant in Singapore for supply 
of biologics in adjacent Asian markets, and AstraZeneca opened a biologic manufactur-
ing plant in China through a joint venture with a Chinese company (Palmer, 2012). 
Also, companies like Eli Lilly and Bristol-Myers Squibb are expanding their biologic 
R&D and manufacturing operation in the US (Palmer, 2013c).  
     To cut back costs and balance the revenue loss from diminished value of off-patent 
drugs, big pharma is slashing its primary care sales force in developed markets that fo-
cused on patented blockbuster drugs, and is keeping the sales force small for specialty 
drug marketing (Staton, 2012b). Big pharma is turning to emerging markets to grab the 
share of the market that is predicted to reach as high as $375 billion by 2016. Big 
pharma is also taking control over many generic manufacturers, primarily in emerging 
markets through joint ventures, to capture the value of global generic markets that will 
grow from around $240 billion in 2011 to $430 billion in 2016. In 2012, Pfizer formed 
joint venture with China’s Zhejiang Hisun Pharmaceutical to develop and manufacture 
branded generics for China and global markets. In 2010, Abbott became one of India’s 
largest generic drug manufacturers by acquiring Piramal’s Healthcare Solutions for $3.7 
billion (IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, 2012, Burrill, 2013).  
     The path ahead for big pharma is one that encompasses a conglomeration of diversi-
fied business models targeted at developed and emerging markets. In developed mar-
kets, big pharma will focus on high price specialty drugs for chronic, complex and rare 
diseases, and low price generics for common diseases to replace the value of block-
buster prescription drugs. In emerging markets, big pharma will extend its value 
through increasing its stake in branded and low-cost generic manufacturing for both 
developed and emerging markets. 
 
Soaring R&D costs and declining R&D productivity 
 
In the last decade or so, pharmaceutical companies have experienced phenomenal 
growth in the cost of bringing new drug candidates from the lab to the market. R&D 
budgets of pharmaceutical companies climbed as well to manage ever increasing drug 
development costs. But there has not been concomitant growth in the number of truly 
innovative or potential revenue-generating new drugs (in relation to R&D expendi-
tures) launched in the market (Paul et al., 2010). A number of studies over the last 
decade attempted to estimate the average cost of drug development, from discovery 
through preclinical and clinical development to regulatory approval, based on internal 
industry data as well as external industry survey data. A 2012 study by London-based 
Office of Health Economics (Mestre-Ferrandiz et al., 2012) calculated the average out-
of-pocket cost of bringing a new drug to market as $900 million (in 2011 dollar prices). 
This cost includes the costs of all drug candidates that fail at different development 
stages before one reaches the market. Another 2010 study (Paul et al., 2010) estimated 
19  
TARIQ SADAT, ROSLYN RUSSELL & MARK STEWART  
the out-of-pocket cost of single drug development as $873 million (in 2008 dollar 
prices). Two previous studies, published in 1991 (DiMasi et al., 1991) and 2003 
(DiMasi et al., 2003), determined the out-of-pocket costs per single drug development 
as $114 million (in 1987 dollar prices) and $403 million (in 2000 dollar prices), respec-
tively.  
     However, a 2012 Forbes article shows that the amounts of dollars spent on R&D  by 
different big pharma companies to produce a single drug are around four to twelve 
times higher than the empirical out-of-pocket costs described above (Herper, 2012). In 
this article, average R&D spending per approved drug of eleven big pharma companies 
is calculated by dividing each company’s total R&D spending by its total number of 
drugs approved between 1997 and 2011. This is illustrated in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: R&D Spending by Big Pharma per Approved Drug 
 
According to Table 1, with its lowest number of approved drugs, AstraZeneca spent 
the highest average of $11.8 billion for each approved drug. In contrast, Novartis’ high-
est number of drug approvals brought its average R&D spending for each drug to the 
lowest. Table 1 shows how expensive it is to bring a new drug to the market, and may, 
therefore, justify the extraordinary high price of many specialty drugs. However, the 
figures raise the questions of why big pharma’s R&D spending for each drug (from $4 
billion to nearly $12 billion) is so much higher than the empirical R&D costs (less than 
$1 billion), and where does big pharma lose its R&D money? Billions of dollars in lost 
R&D can be attributed to a number of factors. The new drugs being developed are 
faced with the challenges of demonstrating to regulators and consumers their superior-
ity in safety, efficacy and value over many available therapeutic modalities. Many dec-
Company 
Total R&D Spend-
ing 1997-2011  
($ billion) 
Number of Ap-
proved Drugs 
Average R&D Spend-
ing Per Drug  
($ billion) 
AstraZeneca 59.0 5 11.8 
GlaxoSmithKline 81.7 10 8.2 
Sanofi 63.3 8 7.9 
Roche 85.8 11 7.8 
Pfizer 108.2 14 7.7 
Johnson & Johnson 88.3 15 5.9 
Eli Lilly 50.3 11 4.6 
Abbott Laboratories 36.0 8 4.5 
Merck 67.4 16 4.2 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 45.7 11 4.2 
Novartis 83.6 21 4.0 
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ades of scientific and technological advances have resulted in many successful therapeu-
tic modalities for diseases like cancer and diabetes. This, in turn, has raised the chal-
lenges for new drugs to prove their superior value. Such challenges have been met by 
expanding the size, number and duration of clinical trials that have significantly added 
to R&D costs. Millions of dollars have already been spent before many of the new drug 
candidates in late development stages fail to demonstrate their superior value. Scientific 
and technological advances have also increased the precision of therapeutic targets, and 
the need to show precise effectiveness of new drugs on those targets. Many drug candi-
dates fail such precision tests (Munos, 2009; Paul et al., 2010; Scannell et al., 2012; 
Northrup et al., 2012). 
     In order to sustain productivity, big pharma needs to close the gap between what 
R&D per new drug candidate should cost and what big pharma spends on R&D. This 
means big pharma’s R&D spending is not significantly higher than the empirical out-of-
pocket R&D costs, and thus the value created in new drugs through R&D substantially 
exceeds big pharma’s R&D spending on new drugs. R&D productivity of big pharma is 
also declining steadily as high-value brands are increasingly being taken over by low-
value generics, high price and other existing brands are facing forced discounts and 
price cuts, and many drug candidates are failing during development. As the 
‘blockbuster era’ is coming to an end, and multi-billion dollar brands are becoming 
scarce, expensive R&D budgets are becoming unsustainable.  
 
Open Innovation networks and improving R&D productivity 
 
Many big pharma companies are joining forces with leading academic researchers as 
well as biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies to boost early stage drug discov-
ery research and improve R&D productivity. In November 2010, Pfizer launched 
‘Global Centers for Therapeutic Innovation’ in the US to develop an open innovation 
style network of partnerships with leading academic medical centres in the US to com-
bine their scientific expertise in drug discovery with Pfizer’s drug development capa-
bilities. The purpose is to establish a number of Pfizer funded local research centres at 
the medical centre sites. At these centres academic researchers and Pfizer’s protein and 
development scientists will jointly perform early stage discovery and clinical research 
with Pfizer’s proprietary protein libraries to develop novel and differentiated biologic 
drugs (Pfizer, 2010; Allarakhia, 2011). Johnson and Johnson is also setting up innova-
tion centres in Boston, San Francisco, London and Shanghai. These centres will be 
working to find local drug discovery expertise among academic and biotechnology 
communities and create collaborations with them (Carroll, 2013c).  
     In August 2012, ten of the large pharmaceutical companies launched a precompeti-
tive and non-profit joint venture in the US, called TransCelerate Biopharma. This ini-
tiative aims to facilitate the sharing of capabilities and resources to find and accomplish 
efficient and cost-effective models of R&D. The ten companies are Abbott Laborato-
ries, AstraZeneca, Boehringer Ingelheim, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly, GlaxoSmith-
Kline, Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer, Roche's Genentech unit and Sanofi. TransCelerate 
Biopharma initially set the goal of reducing bottlenecks in clinical development such as 
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cost and length of clinical trials by streamlining and standardising clinical trial functions 
(McBride, 2012a; Burrill, 2013). 
     In October 2012, GlaxoSmithKline, in an open innovation approach, announced its 
intention to publish its clinical data on 200 compounds, with potential anti-tuberculosis 
(TB) properties, to allow external researchers to use them in TB drug development 
(McBride, 2012b). In another open innovation approach, in February 2013, seven of 
Europe’s large pharmaceutical companies, including Bayer, AstraZeneca, Johnson & 
Johnson group’s Janssen Pharmaceutical, Sanofi, Merck KGaA, in collaboration with 23 
other universities, research organisations and small- to medium-sized biotechnology 
companies, launched a €196 million drug discovery platform, called ‘European Lead 
Factory’. It was built to boost drug discovery by exploiting cutting-edge academic re-
search, and produce a large library of half a million chemical compounds with therapeu-
tic potentials for screening and development (McBride, 2013). In early 2013, the Euro-
pean Commission launched a $187 million research initiative which brought 300 inves-
tigators from academia, pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies across 29 coun-
tries under one roof with the plan to find 200 treatments for rare heart, liver and kid-
ney diseases by 2020 (Carroll, 2013d).  
 
Delivering value to users 
 
As payers are taking charge of determining the value of new drugs, big pharma is col-
laborating with payers to develop models of identifying and pinpointing value users 
(treatment responsive patients), evaluating comparative effectiveness of new drugs, and 
delivering perceived value to users. In 2011, Pfizer established a collaboration with 
Medco Health Solutions, a pharmacy benefits management organisation in the US, to 
integrate identification of patient subgroups through genomic and phenotypic charac-
terisation that are most likely to respond to new and existing drugs. Pfizer also estab-
lished collaboration with Humana, a managed healthcare (insurance) company in the 
US, to identify and implement ways to improve quality and cost-effectiveness of 
chronic disease management. Also, in 2011, Sanofi formed a collaboration with Medco 
Health Solutions to precisely identify treatment responsive patient populations, and 
develop patient care models to improve healthcare practice, treatment adherence and 
patient outcomes (Burrill, 2013).  
     Additionally, big pharma is pursuing risk-sharing agreements with payers whereby 
rebates, discounts or refunds on new drugs are offered by them to cover the cost of 
drugs having treatment response failure or response rates below expectations compared 
with existing alternatives. Such agreements include GlaxoSmithKline’s agreement with 
NICE to offer rebate on kidney cancer drug Votrient if it is found inferior to Pfizer’s 
similar drug Sutent, and with AIFA (Italian Medicines Agency) to pay for patients not 
responding to 24 weeks of treatment with Votrient (Ernst and Young, 2013). 
     To better demonstrate the effectiveness and value of new drugs to regulators and 
payers, big pharma is focusing on the development of personalised medicines. As the 
name implies, personalised medicines work on a specific patient subgroup who express 
a particular disease trait. The disease trait is identifiable by a companion diagnostic test. 
So, by using the diagnostic test the patient subgroup can be selected for treatment with 
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personalised medicines. In May 2013, GlaxoSmithKline won US FDA approval for two 
advanced skin cancer drugs, Tafinlar and Mekinist. The drugs target skin cell tumours 
with mutations to the BRAF gene. BRAF gene mutation accounts for half of all skin 
cancer cases. Alongside the two drugs, US FDA approved a molecular diagnostic test, 
‘THxID BRAF mutation test’, developed by French company bioMérieux. In clinical 
trials, the diagnostic test was used to select patients with the BRAF gene mutation and 
this helped the cancer drugs to produce satisfactory results (Carroll and McBride, 
2013; Garde, 2013). 
     Big pharma is also building innovative healthcare delivery models in many emerging 
markets through engaging doctors, patients and policy maker stakeholders in various 
healthcare initiatives. In 2007, Novartis started a program called ‘good health of the 
family’ in India. As part of the program, Novartis trained 500 people to partner with 
rural doctors to organise health education meetings for villagers. Also, Novartis repre-
sentatives were handing out referral cards to patients that they could take to doctors 
and pharmacies with stocks of Novartis drugs for rural diseases like diarrhoea and pneu-
monia (Sharma, 2010).  
     Sanofi, in 2009, also initiated a program in India, called ‘endevour’. As part of the 
program, Sanofi engaged volunteer city doctors to mentor rural doctors. By 2010, it 
had sponsored workshops for more than 5,500 doctors, and planned to include 
100,000 doctors by 2015 (Sharma, 2010).  
     In 2011, Sanofi announced its support for China’s integrated diabetes management 
program, called ‘China Initiative for Diabetes Excellence’, jointly launched by China’s 
Ministry of Health, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Chi-
nese Diabetes Society of the Chinese Medical Association. The program was designed 
to develop 500 diabetes care and public health experts who would collaborate with 
grassroots-level doctors to deliver diabetes care. The program also aimed to train 
10,000 community and county doctors on delivery of diabetes patient education 
(Sanofi, 2011).  
     In April 2013, Sanofi announced the opening of a €20 million new logistics hub in 
Casablanca, Morocco, for distribution of Sanofi drugs to Moroccan and sub-Saharan 
African markets. Sanofi also signed three collaboration agreements with the Ministry of 
Trade, Industry and New Technologies and the Ministry of Health of Morocco with the 
aim of 1) developing standard care protocols and therapeutic education programs for 
type I diabetes patients, 2) training neurologists, psychiatrists, general practitioners and 
nurses, and raising public awareness to facilitate care for patients with mental disorders 
and epilepsy, and 3) contributing to the development of Moroccan pharmaceutical in-
dustry by training people for careers in the pharmaceutical industry (Sanofi, 2013). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The big pharma-dominated pharmaceutical industry has long enjoyed the success of 
innovation through its integrated model of commercialising blockbuster drugs. The 
success was achieved through big pharma’s ability to create and command the value that 
was embodied in its blockbuster drugs. Healthcare reforms in many developed and 
emerging countries and growing emerging market needs are expanding opportunities. 
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However, drug pricing and reimbursement pressures from governments and payers, 
increasing dominance of generic drugs over patented blockbuster drugs and rising R&D 
costs are impeding big pharma’s growth. Big pharma is responding to these opportuni-
ties and challenges by adapting its innovation models. As the analyses in this paper point 
out, while the value of pharmaceutical innovation is embodied in new drugs, the value 
of new drugs is now determined by market-specific users based on the benefits of these 
drugs they can access. The success of new drugs now depends on how users in differen-
tiated markets access and perceive their value. Consequently, big pharma is comple-
menting its model of creating value through new drugs and new markets with one that 
is focused on making the benefits (value) accessible to users.  
     In the new model, pharmaceutical innovation is open in the sense that big pharma is 
pursuing innovation in-house as well as through collaborative networks with external 
innovators, and commercialising innovation by exploiting in-house capabilities as well 
as through various external partners. This is consistent with Chesbrough’s (2003, pp. 
37) definition of open innovation, ‘a company commercialises both its own ideas as 
well as innovations from other firms and seeks ways to bring its in-house ideas to mar-
ket by deploying pathways outside its current businesses’. However, there is another 
degree of openness in the new model of pharmaceutical innovation. The value is cre-
ated by big pharma as innovators through new drugs and new drug markets; but, as 
discussed in this paper, the value is embodied as perceived value in the benefits of new 
drugs. The perceived value is created by both big pharma and the value users, including 
payers, patients, physicians and policy makers, through various value propositions such 
as drug price cuts, discounts, specialty drugs, branded generics, personalised medi-
cines, treatment responsive patient identification and risk-sharing agreements with pay-
ers, and joint healthcare delivery initiatives. 
     Through illustrations of big pharma’s various responses to external and internal 
forces of innovation, this paper also points toward a new landscape of the global phar-
maceutical industry. As healthcare demands of emerging markets are steadily increas-
ing, the long prevailing developed market-centric pharmaceutical industry is becoming 
increasingly focused on emerging markets. However, a division of value proposition 
between developed and emerging markets is also becoming evident. In developed mar-
kets, big pharma is aiming cumulative returns from multiple niche chronic care markets 
with its high value specialty drugs by exploiting established healthcare financing sys-
tems. In emerging markets, where healthcare financing systems are still in their infancy, 
big pharma is aiming for low value but high volume returns from a sharply expanding 
healthcare consumer market with its heavily discounted specialty drugs and low value 
generics of patented blockbuster drugs. Since the value of traditional blockbuster drugs 
are diminishing rapidly, big pharma is seeking ways to capture value from new markets, 
such as specialty drugs for unmet, rare diseases, and drugs for disadvantaged and unin-
sured consumers in vastly untapped global markets. In the new landscape, the value of 
pharmaceutical innovation lies in the path towards new opportunities. The path for-
ward for the big pharma-dominated pharmaceutical industry is one that makes a shift 
from product-centric innovation towards market-centric innovation. 
     On the one side, healthcare reforms, drug price controls and dominance of low 
price generic drugs are paving the way for accessible healthcare for the majority of 
 SHIFTING PATHS OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 
24  
population in both developed and developing ends of the world; on the other side, the 
market-centric pharmaceutical innovation models are creating ways to deliver the value 
to users. In tomorrow’s world, as this paper finds, healthcare will not only be cheap 
and accessible to all, but also efficient and manageable to healthcare stakeholders. 
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